Institute of Sociology
of the Federal Center of Theoretical and Applied Sociology
of the Russian Academy of Sciences

Antonovskiy A.Yu., Barash R.E. “Scientific Rationality in the Language of Systems-communications Theory”. Voprosy Filosofii. 2023. No. 10. P. 146–150.



Antonovskiy A.Yu., Barash R.E. “Scientific Rationality in the Language of Systems-communications Theory”. Voprosy Filosofii. 2023. No. 10. P. 146–150.
ISSN 0042-8744
DOI 10.21146/0042-8744-2023-10-146-150
ÐÈÍÖ: https://elibrary.ru/contents.asp?id=54613918

Posted on site: 29.11.23

 


Abstract

The problem of the “experimenter’s regress” is widely discussed in the modern philosophy of science [Collins 1985]. However, it allows generalization and can be presented as a theoretical-cognitive paradox, as a philosophical-linguistic problem of reference and as a problem of philosophy of consciousness. The reliability of the functioning of “reality detectors” of any kind (devices, sensual abilities, theories, language statements or mental acts) is confirmed empirically if they discover new objects and adequately describe their characteristics (in the format of measurement data, sensual qualities, scientific facts, referents of words and concepts). The properties of the observed reality discovered with their help, obviously, act as a rational criterion for the choice of observational instruments or “reality detectors”. But after all, the criterion of rational selection (evaluation, recognition) of the results of observation from the array of all received data is the application of the best (more powerful, effective, reliable, and receptive) detectors of reality. This paradox of self-referral is also applicable to researchers themselves: the reputation of a scientist acts as a criterion for the selection of his research results (including acceptance of his publications in leading editions, etc.), and the research results obtained obviously determine his reputation. Based on the systemic-communicative approach, the authors argue that scientific rationality does not contradict, but is based on the self-referential character of scientific communication.